

# Particle Physics Division

# Mechanical Department Engineering Note

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Project: COUPP

Title: ODH & CF3I Safety Analysis for E-961, COUPP – 60 kg

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Key Words: ODH, CF3I, safety, COUPP

### Abstract/Summary:

This is a formal safety analysis evaluating the ODH risk and CF3I exposure risk posed by operation of the COUPP 60 kg bubble chamber.

#### **Applicable Codes**:

Fermilab Environmental, Safety, and Health Manual chapter 5064, Oxygen Deficiency Hazards

American Conference of Governmental Industrial Hygienists (ACGIH) 2005 Threshold Limit Values (TLVs) for Chemical Substances and Physical Agents & Biological Exposure Indices (BEIs) – Minimal Oxygen Content

National Research Council, Committee on Toxicology, Subcommittee on Iodotrifluoromethane, "Iodotrifluoromethane: Toxicity Review". (National Academies Press, 2004)

# **CF<sub>3</sub>I Release Safety Analysis**

#### **Outline**

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- V. Components, leak rates, probabilities
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- VII. ODH calculations
- VIII. Conclusion

### **Summary**


The analysis definitively shows no risk of ODH from the presence of  $CF_3I$ . The empty water tank (confined space) and the DZero pit are both shown to be ODH class 0. The exposure risk of  $CF_3I$  during normal operations is minimal and requires no special precautions. The bubble chamber will need to be filled at the beginning of operations and emptied before disassembly. The batch fill or emptying operation poses increased risk for  $CF_3I$  exposure. This risk is exclusively from a potential valve error by an operator. The risk is mitigated to a safe level by requiring a written procedure and an independent person verifying valve operation during the procedure. It can also be effectively argued that the operator would limit the  $CF_3I$  release to negligible amounts by quickly reclosing the valve.

### **General Discussion**

The COUPP 60 kg bubble chamber will contain up to 80 kg of CF<sub>3</sub>I (Trifluormethyl Iodide). CF<sub>3</sub>I is a fire extinguishing agent. It is being used for the COUPP experiment because of its nuclear characteristics. It has the right mass for exploring weakly interacting massive particles (WIMPS). One possible safety concern would be an Oxygen Deficiency Hazard caused by a

release of  $CF_3I$ . Another possible safety concern is that  $CF_3I$  is an irritant at levels greater than 0.2%  $CF_3I$  in air.

The sealed volume of the bubble chamber contains about 40 liters of liquid  $CF_3I$  and 40 liters of liquid water. The liquid density of the  $CF_3I$  is twice that of water so the  $CF_3I$  resides in the quartz jar portion of the chamber with water floating on top.



**Picture 1.** Liquid CF<sub>3</sub>I resides in the lower half of the bubble chamber, H<sub>2</sub>O in the upper.

The CF<sub>3</sub>I is maintained as a liquid because pressure is applied on the dome of the expansion bellows. Propylene glycol surrounds the bubble chamber and is considered the "hydraulic" fluid of the system. See the table below for the anticipated operating conditions.

CF3I CF3I CF3I CF3I Fixed **Bellows** Volume Position Temp Pressure Density Mass State (Celcius) (Mpa) (kg/m^3) Comments (Liters) (kg) (inches) 0.4 2204.7 During fill, condensing 1 36.00 79.372 -1.862 Room temp. 20 0.425 2103.3 Sat. Liquid at 20 C 37.74 79.372 -1.02 3 Operating Temp. - stable 40 0.72985 1992.3 saturated liquid 39.84 79.372 0.01 40 4 Operating - cocked 0.1 1984.3 unstable Liquid ready to boil 40.00 79.372 0.09 Operating - midpoint 40 0.8 1993.2 \*Bellows at free length 39.82 79.372 0.00 1.5 6 Operating - recompression 40 2002 1 Recompression Pressure 39.64 79.372 -0.09 Aux. operating - stable 50 0.9324 1931.4 saturated liquid 41.10 79.372 0.62 8 Aux. operating - cocked 50 0.1 1918.5 unstable Liquid ready to boil 41.37 79.372 0.76 9 Aux. operating - recompression 50 1.5 1940.3 Recompression Pressure 40.91 79.372 0.53 Relieving point of outer vessel 10 40 2.172 2010.6 Compressed liquid 39.48 79.372 -0.17

**Table 1.** Operating states for the COUPP bubble chamber.

The vapor density of  $CF_3I$  is  $8.37 \text{ kg/m}^3$  at 20 C and atmospheric pressure. If the 80 kg of  $CF_3I$  is allowed to boil and be released, the volume of gas that will be created is  $9.5 \text{ m}^3$ . As long as the bubble chamber is operated in a volume large enough to prevent oxygen concentrations from falling below 19.5%, the oxygen deficiency concern is removed. A room volume of  $133 \text{ m}^3$  along with an assumption of mixing, insures that the oxygen will be at or above 19.5%.

### Safety Analysis - Worst Case analysis


### Unspecified immediate release of entire contents:

Under normal circumstances, the bubble chamber will be operated in a hot water bath with enclosed light tight tank lid. A release under the water would mean that the  $CF_3I$  vapor would inert the tank lid space (about  $2.4 \, \mathrm{m}^3$ ) and then spill out the perimeter of the tank. The perimeter of the tank is only roughly sealed for light leak purposes. The tank lid is not gas tight. The specific gravity of  $CF_3I$  vapor relative to air is 6.9. There is evidence from experiments done with helium (Specific Gravity =  $0.138 = (7.2)^{-1}$ ) in the Tevatron tunnel that even with density differences by a factor of 7, it more likely that mixing rather than stratification accurately describes what occurs.

The COUPP experiment is located in "the pit" in the DZero Assembly Building. See picture 2. The pit is a 15 meter (50 feet) x 21 meter (70 feet) floor area that is 2.3 meters (7.5 feet) lower than the sidewalks located on each side. Total volume of the pit = 724 m<sup>3</sup>. If the total 9.5 m<sup>3</sup> of gas was considered to mix in the volume of the pit, then the concentration of  $CF_3I$  would be 9.5 m<sup>3</sup>/(15 m x21 m x 2.3 m) = 0.013 or 1.3%  $CF_3I$ . This is above the  $CF_3I$  concentration threshold that is conservatively acceptable. The oxygen concentration would be 0.21 \* (15 m x 21 m x 2.3 m – 9.5 m<sup>3</sup>) /(15 m x21 m x 2.3 m) = 0.207 = 20.7%. Since the oxygen concentration is nearly normal and greater than 19.5%, the release does not pose an oxygen deficiency hazard.



**Picture 2.** COUPP equipment located in "the Pit" at DZero Assembly building. Note water tank with vessel inside.



Picture 3. COUPP Outer vessel located inside the 4000 gallon water tank.

Alternatively, if the 9.5 m<sup>3</sup> of gas was considered not to mix, then 1.9 m<sup>3</sup> would stay in the water tank above the water but below the top edge of the shell. The remaining 7.6 m<sup>3</sup> would spill over the edge and stratify to a layer 2.4 centimeters deep on the pit floor.

If the  $9.5 \, \text{m}^3$  release occurred in an empty water tank, the CF<sub>3</sub>I concentration in the water tank volume (4000 gallon =  $15 \, \text{m}^3$ ) could potentially be very high, 63% along with oxygen levels disastrously low, only 7.7%. Therefore a more rigorous analysis (contained later in this note) and some forced air ventilation is required. During access into the empty tank (with or without CF<sub>3</sub>I present) confined space procedures are always followed. This includes active oxygen concentration sampling using a calibrated sensing unit, an unexposed observer, a means for rescue without entry into the tank, and an approved confined space permit.

### <u>Safety Analysis methodology – Traditional analysis</u>

The safety analysis methodology that will be followed is Fermilab's safety and health manual chapter on Oxygen Deficiency Hazards, FESHM 5064 revision May 2009. Sections of this chapter are excerpted below.<sup>ii</sup>

The oxygen deficiency hazard fatality rate is defined as:


$$\phi = \sum_{i=1}^{n} P_i F_i$$

where  $\emptyset$  = the ODH fatality rate (per hour),

P<sub>i</sub> = the expected rate of the i<sup>th</sup> event (per hour), and

 $F_i$  = the probability of a fatality due to event i.

The summation shall be taken over all events, which may cause oxygen deficiency and result in fatality. The value of  $F_i$  is the probability that a person will die if the i<sup>th</sup> event occurs. The value depends on the oxygen concentration. If the lowest oxygen concentration is greater than 18%, then the value of  $F_i$  is zero, that is, all exposures above 18% are defined to be "safe" and to not contribute to fatality. It is assumed that all exposures to 18% oxygen or lower do contribute to fatality and the value of  $F_i$  is designed to reflect this dependence. If the lowest attainable oxygen concentration is 18%, then the value of  $F_i$  is  $10^{-7}$ . This value would cause f to be  $10^{-7}$  per hour if the expected rate of occurrence of the event were 1 per hour. At decreasing concentrations, the value of  $F_i$  should increase until, at some point, the probability of fatality becomes unity. That point was selected to be 8.8% oxygen, the concentration at which one minute of consciousness is expected.



For the ODH analysis that will be made for entry into an empty water tank with CF3I present, the analysis method will be followed directly. The summation of the hazard fatality rate is made and since the result is less than  $10^{-7}$  hr<sup>-1</sup>, the ODH classification is class 0. The risk is minimized to an acceptable level without special precautions or training.

To evaluate the concern of CF3I exposure, a modification of the terms is made to the analysis.

The CF3I adverse exposure rate is defined as:

$$\mathbf{x} = \sum P_i D_i$$

where X = the adverse exposure rate (per hour),

 $P_{i}$  = the expected rate of the  $i^{\text{th}}$  event (per hour), and

 $D_i$  = the probability of an exposure due to event i.

The summation shall be taken over all events, which may cause a release of  $CF_3I$  and result in an adverse exposure. As was noted in the general discussion,  $CF_3I$  is an irritant at levels on the order of 0.2%. The 0.2%  $CF_3I$  level is considered the no-observed-adverse-effect level (NOAEL) with levels of up to 0.3% acceptable for periods of exposure up to five minutes. Will call a concentration of 0.2%  $CF_3I$  or lower from the i<sup>th</sup> event equal to a value of  $D_i$  of zero. This reasons that an exposure at less than 0.2% is acceptable. An upper threshold of exposure will be set at 0.4%. At this level, critical  $CF_3I$  blood concentration for cardiac sensitization was achieved after 51 seconds. For exposures greater than or equal to 0.4%  $CF_3I$ ,  $D_i$  is equal to unity. I will scale the value of  $D_i$  linearly 0.0 to 1.0 for concentrations between 0.2% and 0.4%.

CF<sub>3</sub>I is used as a fire extinguishing fluid. During such use, the possibility of direct contact with the CF<sub>3</sub>I stream might be possible. The design concentration for use as a fire extinguisher is 5% to 7% concentrations. A reasonable adverse exposure rate would be equivalent to the rate at which a fire extinguisher might be used. The annual probability of fire extinguisher use is 12% according to one source and sounds reasonable. That frequency equates to  $\mathbf{X} = 0.12/(365*24 \, \mathrm{hrs}) = 1.4 \times 10^{-5}$  uses per hour. This will be the level (equivalent to ODH class 0) where the risk of CF<sub>3</sub>I exposure is at an acceptable level without any precautions taken.

**Table 2.** The cases that will be analyzed are:

ODH	Inside empty water tank	Normal operations, sealed BC
CF3I exposure	Inside empty water tank	Normal operations, sealed BC
CF3I exposure	Pit work area	Normal operations, sealed BC
ODH	Inside empty water tank	Batch Fill or Emptying operation
CF3I exposure	Inside empty water tank	Batch Fill or Emptying operation
CF3I exposure	Pit work area	Batch Fill or Emptying operation

Each analysis will be done using a spreadsheet format. Inputs are ventilation rate, room or tank volume, an enumeration of components and their failure rates and maximum possible leak rate.

# Components, leak rates and probabilities

The components that are in direct contact to the CF3I bubble chamber volume during normal operation are very limited since it is a sealed volume. There is a section of exposed 1" OD x 0.065" wall stainless steel tube that protrudes out of the lid of the outer vessel. There is one main valve, MV-84, and two other valves, MV-83 and MV-80 connected to the purge port of that main valve. There are a total of 5 VCR connections for these valves and to a pressure transmitter, PT-83. Failure rates are determined from tables in FESHM 5064. The failure rate for rupture of the tube section is  $1 \times 10^{-9}$ /hr. Valve leak or rupture rates are  $1 \times 10^{-8}$ /hr. The bellows failure rate is  $3 \times 10^{-6}$ /hr based on it being equivalent to a flex hose. Connections have failure rates of  $3 \times 10^{-6}$ /hr for a complete rupture or  $3 \times 10^{-7}$ /hr for a leak. Welds leaking have a failure rate of  $3 \times 10^{-6}$ /hr. The absolute maximum leak rate possible is bounded by the maximum flow rate that can be achieved up the 1" OD tube during a release. Initially during a release, water would be ejected since it floats on top of the CF<sub>3</sub>I. If the hydraulic system was pressurized, four liters of water would be ejected before the stop plate bottomed out and prevented further collapse of the expansion volume bellows. CF<sub>3</sub>I would boil at a saturation pressure of 106 psia in the bubble chamber. The maximum flow rate that can be achieved up

the tube with 106 psia – 15 psia = 91 psi differential pressure is 684 scfm. This flow rate is limited by the speed of sound in the fluid (106 m/s) and the cross sectional area of the tube. Flow out the main valve is about the same since it is a full ported valve. Flow out the other two valves or any other leaks is limited to a maximum of 29 scfm limited by the cross sectional area of the  $\frac{1}{2}$ " OD x 0.035" wall tubing. An obvious (detectable) leaking connection would be equivalent to a 0.020" diameter hole which would flow at 0.2 scfm.

#### Hydraulic system leak & subsequent CF3I release through ruptured bellows

A loss of pressure in the hydraulic system would cause a pressure differential to develop across the expansion chamber and quartz jar. The large bellows of the expansion chamber is 0.012" thick and is the weakest component in the containment volume. CF<sub>3</sub>I would boil to create 3.3 liters of gas which expands the bellows to the end of its allowed travel (+1.625"). A stop plate that is welded to the top of the 1" tube bottoms out against shoulder bolts limiting further bellows travel. The internal pressure in the bubble chamber would be CF<sub>3</sub>I saturation pressure, 0.73 MPa, at the operating temperature of 40 C. The quartz jar with wall thickness of 4 mm has an allowable internal working pressure rating of at least 1.4 MPa, so it will not break. The bellows design pressure is 0.3 MPa. The bellows manufacturer, Hyspan, states that a permanent set will not occur at pressures 1.5 times the design pressure or in this case 0.5 MPa.

It would be conservative to assume that the bellows leaks at 0.73 MPa. But assuming that it does, the  $CF_3I$  would continue to boil and pass through the bellows leak and then into the propylene glycol space. The  $CF_3I$  as a gas would start displacing the propylene glycol volume from the top down. 9.5 m³ = 9500 liters of  $CF_3I$  gas exceeds the entire volume of the propylene glycol volume = 280 liters (74 gallons) so eventually the  $CF_3I$  gas would leak out the leak in the hydraulic system. But first, some portion of the propylene glycol would need to leak out and that would be obvious to any observer.

The maximum  $CF_3I$  flow rate from a leak through the bellows wall and then through a leak in the hydraulic system can only be based on reasonable speculation. We could speculate for instance that a failure of the bellows into the glycol space would not be catastrophic (large rupture) since the bellows is surrounded by liquid and is made of type 321 stainless steel which is ductile. I can imagine at most a bellows wall crack on the order of 1 mm wide x 5 mm long. A similar sized leak (or larger) in the hydraulic system is required. Based on sonic velocity through that crack, the  $CF_3I$  maximum flow rate is 10 scfm. I will use that in m calculations.

#### Batch fill or batch emptying operations

Special consideration must be given to the occasional situation when we are transferring CF<sub>3</sub>I to or from the bubble chamber via a transfer line connected to a storage container. Extra components are present such as the transfer line and evacuation/purge line. A knowledgeable operator will be required to open and close valves while observing the mass transfer. The water tank will be empty during filling or emptying operations. Emptying or filling are expected to occur at the frequency of once or twice a year. The transfer line size is on the order of ½" OD tube contained within foam insulation or jacketed by a heating/cooling fluid. The transfer line is connected and the line evacuated and then backfilled a number of times. As the last step, the main valve MV-84 is opened to allow gas transfer. When filling, a supply cylinder at a temperature of 20 Celsius and 0.425 MPa pressure is located outside of the water tank. The bubble chamber is cooled to 1 C and condensation occurs. When emptying, a stinger tube is inserted into the bottom of the bubble chamber where the CF<sub>3</sub>I is located. The bubble chamber is at a temperature of 20 C and the container to be transferred to is in an ice bath at 1 C. The extra components are added into the spreadsheets to account for the extra items. An extra line, "operator error" is added to account for the possibility that the operator opens a purge valve while the transfer line is open to a CF<sub>3</sub>I source. The rate of human errors such as this is 3x10<sup>-3</sup> per demand. There are maybe 3 times that a different valve needs to be operated during the operation. The maximum leak rate is 17 scfm and is based on having a high purity carten MD-250 or equivalent valve with flow coefficient of 0.3.

### **Ventilation**

As a good engineering practice some form of active ventilation will need to be provided when accessing the empty water tank once an inert gas source is present. Typical ventilation units used for confined space entry are on the order of 800 to 1500 cfm. In the analysis, 500 cfm is used so that there is some flexibility in choice. Most if not all blowers or fans with an output duct diameter of 8" exceed the 500 cfm rate. The results of the analysis do not change if the ventilation is increased to 1000 cfm nor does it change if the ventilation is decreased to 100 cfm. The volume of the empty tank is 530 cubic feet.

The DZero Assembly hall pit has the building return air ducts located in the east wall of the pit. The ventilation for the assembly hall is about 24,000 cfm. About half of the assembly hall air is returned through the pit ducts. Other return air ducts exist. The value of 5000 cfm was used in

the analysis as a conservative value. The pit is 50 feet by 70 feet by 7.5 feet high which calculates to a volume of 26,250 cubic feet.

### **Analysis and Results**

The methodology of the traditional analysis was explained earlier in this note. The calculations are done in a spreadsheet format with equations from FESHM 5064. Case A described in the chapter was most applicable for the tank space. It is a case that assumed mixing and some ventilation input. Below is the pertinent equation excerpted from the chapter:

<u>Case A</u> During release - Ventilation fan(s) blowing outside air into the confined volume. Differential equation for the oxygen mass balance

(1) 
$$V\frac{dC}{dt} = 0.21Q - (R+Q)C$$

Solution with the boundary condition of C=0.21 at t=0

$$C(t) = \left(\frac{0.21}{Q + R}\right) \left[Q + R e^{-\left(\frac{Q + R}{V}\right)t}\right]$$
(2)

#### **Definitions**

C = oxygen concentration

Cr = oxygen concentration during the release

Ce = oxygen concentration after the release has ended

Q = ventilation rate of fan(s), (cfm or  $m^3/s$ )

R = spill rate into confined volume, (scfm or  $m^3/s$ )

t = time, (minutes or seconds) beginning of release is at t=0

 $t_{\rm e}$  = time when release has ended, (minutes or seconds)

 $V = confined volume, (ft^3 or m^3)$ 

Some time input is necessary. For analysis inside the empty water tank, I chose to evaluate the concentrations at 0.5 and 1.0 minutes. This is because it takes very little time to exit the tank if

something bad occurred. CF3I as an irritant is easily detectable and there is also an active, calibrated air sampling unit monitoring the space.

Case B described in FESHM chapter 5064 was most applicable for analyzing the D-Zero Assembly hall pit. It is a case that assumes mixing and an exhaust ventilation rate. The pertinent equation excerpted from the chapter follows:

<u>Case B</u> During release - Ventilation fans(s) drawing contaminated atmosphere from the confined volume with the ventilation rate greater than the spill rate (Q>R).

Differential equation for the oxygen mass balance

$$V\frac{dC}{dt} = 0.21(Q - R) - QC$$

Solution with the boundary condition of C=0.21 at t=0

$$C(t) = 0.21 \left(1 - \frac{R}{Q}\right) \left(1 - e^{-\frac{Q}{V}t}\right)$$

The time input for analysis of the pit volume was chosen to be 5 and 10 minutes. If an event occurred and you were working in the pit, it may take a little while to discover an issue.

The 0.21 used in the equations is the starting fraction of oxygen. Recognizing this, the same equations can be used to calculate the increasing  $CF_3I$  concentration during a release. The 0.21 is replaced by 1.0 so the equation represents the fraction of air during the release. That fraction is subtracted from 1.0 to give the fraction of the inert gas,  $CF_3I$ . The formulas used in the ODH and  $CF_3I$  analysis spreadsheets are included in their raw format after the analysis spreadsheets.

Table 3. Analysis Results

Type of	Location	Operational condition	Ø or χ Summation	Class **
Analysis			(per hour)	
ODH	Inside empty water tank	Normal operation	$\emptyset = 1 \times 10^{-11}$	ODH class 0
CF <sub>3</sub> I	Inside empty	Normal operation	$\chi = 1.6 \times 10^{-5}$	CF <sub>3</sub> I class 1 *
exposure	water tank			
CF <sub>3</sub> I	Pit work area	Normal operation	$\chi = 4.6 \times 10^{-6}$	CF <sub>3</sub> I class 0
exposure				
ODH	Inside empty water tank	Batch Fill or Emptying	$\emptyset = 2x10^{-11}$	ODH class 0
CF <sub>3</sub> I	Inside empty	Batch Fill or Emptying	$\chi = 9.0 \times 10^{-3}$	CF <sub>3</sub> I class 3
exposure	water tank			
CF <sub>3</sub> I	Pit work area	Batch Fill or Emptying	$\chi = 4.0 \times 10^{-3}$	CF <sub>3</sub> I class 3
exposure				

<sup>\*</sup> This value is just over the  $1.4x10^{-5}$  hr<sup>-1</sup> threshold chosen between CF<sub>3</sub>I class 0 and CF<sub>3</sub>I class 1 is  $1.4x10^{-5}$ .

### **Conclusion**

As can be seen in table 3, and earlier arrived at in the worst case bounding analysis, ODH is not a concern.  $CF_3I$  exposure is a minor concern, borderline  $CF_3I$  class 1, for entry into the empty water tank during normal operations. This type of entry might be rather frequent during the initial phase of operations. Propylene glycol high point bleed valves on the outer vessel will need to be manipulated during de-gassing operations. There may also be a need to access the camera enclosure and cameras. Since it is  $CF_3I$  class 1, the precautions that will be taken are: a.) minimum 500 cfm air input into the tank by forced ventilation b.) confined space procedures.

The batch CF<sub>3</sub>I filling or emptying operation has been identified as an operation that has a significant potential for CF<sub>3</sub>I exposure if an operator makes an error in opening a valve that

<sup>\*\*</sup> Class 1 can be thought of as the exposure risk of using a CF3I fire extinguisher every 0.8 to 8 years. Class 2 is like the risk involved in using the fire extinguisher at a frequency between 1 to 10 months. Class 3 is like being exposed to the risk of using a CF3I fire extinguisher at a frequency of every 3 to 30 days.

allows direct venting of CF<sub>3</sub>I into the water tank. Study of the spreadsheets shows that operator error is the only significant event that contributes to the CF<sub>3</sub>I class 3 rating. The CF<sub>3</sub>I concentration inside the tank could reach 2% after a minute of unchecked venting. It is very arguable that an operator error of this type would be only momentary as the operator would quickly re-close the valve and the CF<sub>3</sub>I release very short lived. I note that CF<sub>3</sub>I concentrations for use of fire extinguishers are 5-7%. A precaution that will be taken to help mitigate this risk will be requiring a written procedure and independent verification of valve actions by the confined space attendant. This is in addition to forced ventilation and the confined space procedure. The CF3I analysis for the pit area also resulted in a CF3I class 3 rating due to the possibility of operator error. The CF3I concentration in the pit from that event was only 0.3%. This level is tolerable for the twenty minutes it would take to deplete the entire inventory of CF3I. The argument of this event being short lived and its likelihood reduced with written procedure and independent checks reduces the exposure risk to a negligible level.

# **ODH analysis Inside Empty Water Tank**

Air Input	Q	TC, min.	V/Q		Normal ope	arations	s hubble c	hamhar	isolated			
500	cfm	1.06	¥/ Q		rionnal opi	crations	s, bubble o	ilailiboi	isolatea			
Volume	V	Elevation		Pressure 742								
530	ft^3	700 ft		mmHG		ı	1	1	1	T	1	T
			N	<b>P</b> FAIL	GROUP FAIL	R leak	fO2{t1} FRACT	Time (t2)	fO2{t2} FRACT	F (t2)	<b>Ø</b> Fatal.	ODH
ITEM BC 1"		TYPE		RATE	RATE	rate	02	min.	02	Fatal. Factor	Rate	Class
tube		Bubble Ch.	1	1.00E-09	1.00E-09	684	12.84%	1.00	10.17%	9.47E-04	9.47E-13	0
BC 1" Va BC	lve	Bubble Ch.	1	1.00E-08	1.00E-08	684	12.84%	1.00	10.17%	9.47E-04	9.47E-12	0
Valves		Bubble Ch.	2	1.00E-08	2.00E-08	29	20.55%	1.00	20.27%	1.81E-09	3.62E-17	0
BC Bellov	WS	Bubble Ch.	1	3.00E-06	3.00E-06	29	20.55%	1.00	20.27%	1.81E-09	5.43E-15	0
Conn. rup	oture	Bubble Ch.	5	3.00E-07	1.50E-06	29	20.55%	1.00	20.27%	1.81E-09	2.72E-15	0
leak		Bubble Ch.	5	3.00E-06	1.50E-05	0.2	21.00%	1.00	20.99%	8.41E-10	1.26E-14	0
Instrume	nts	Bubble Ch.	1	1.00E-08	1.00E-08	29	20.55%	1.00	20.27%	1.81E-09	1.81E-17	0
Welds		Bubble Ch.	6	3.00E-09	1.80E-08	29	20.55%	1.00	20.27%	1.81E-09	3.26E-17	0
Pipes		hydraulic	5	1.00E-09	5.00E-09	10	20.84%	1.00	20.75%	1.09E-09	5.47E-18	0
Elbows		hydraulic	10	3.00E-07	3.00E-06	10	20.84%	1.00	20.75%	1.09E-09	3.28E-15	0
Tees		hydraulic	4	3.00E-07	1.20E-06	10	20.84%	1.00	20.75%	1.09E-09	1.31E-15	0
Valves		hydraulic	10	1.00E-08	1.00E-07	10	20.84%	1.00	20.75%	1.09E-09	1.09E-16	0
Connection	ons	hydraulic	20	3.00E-06	6.00E-05	10	20.84%	1.00	20.75%	1.09E-09	6.56E-14	0
Hoses		hydraulic	4	3.00E-06	1.20E-05	10	20.84%	1.00	20.75%	1.09E-09	1.31E-14	0
Instrume	nts	hydraulic	0	1.00E-08	0.00E+00	10	20.84%	1.00	20.75%	1.09E-09	0.00E+00	0
		TOTAL									1.05E-11	0

# CF3I analysis Inside Empty Water Tank

Normal operations, bubble chamber isolated

Air Input	Q	TC, min.	V/Q			•	•				
500	cfm	1.06									
Volume	٧	Elevation		Pressure							
530	ft^3	700 ft		742 mmHG							
			Ν	Р	GROUP	R	Time	fCF3I{t2}	D(t2)	X	CF3I
ITEM		TYPE		FAIL RATE	FAIL RATE	leak rate	(t2) min.	FRACT CF3I	Exposure Factor	Exp. Rate	Class
BC 1" tube		Bubble Ch.	1	1.00E-09	1.00E-09	684	1.00	51.58%	1.00	1.00E-09	0
BC 1" Valve		Bubble Ch.	1	1.00E-08	1.00E-08	684	1.00	51.58%	1.00	1.00E-08	0
BC Valves		Bubble Ch.	2	1.00E-08	2.00E-08	29	1.00	3.46%	1.00	2.00E-08	0
BC Bellows		Bubble Ch.	1	3.00E-06	3.00E-06	29	1.00	3.46%	1.00	3.00E-06	0
Conn. Rupture		Bubble Ch.	5	3.00E-07	1.50E-06	29	1.00	3.46%	1.00	1.50E-06	0
Conn. Leak		Bubble Ch.	5	3.00E-06	1.50E-05	0.2	1.00	0.02%	0.00	0.00E+00	0
Instruments		Bubble Ch.	1	1.00E-08	1.00E-08	29	1.00	3.46%	1.00	1.00E-08	0
Welds		Bubble Ch.	6	3.00E-09	1.80E-08	29	1.00	3.46%	1.00	1.80E-08	0
Pipes		hydraulic	5	1.00E-09	5.00E-09	10	1.00	1.21%	1.00	5.00E-09	0
Elbows		hydraulic	10	3.00E-07	3.00E-06	10	1.00	1.21%	1.00	3.00E-06	0
Tees		hydraulic	4	3.00E-07	1.20E-06	10	1.00	1.21%	1.00	1.20E-06	0
Valves		hydraulic	10	1.00E-08	1.00E-07	10	1.00	1.21%	1.00	1.00E-07	0
Conn. Rupture		hydraulic	20	3.00E-07	6.00E-06	10	1.00	1.21%	1.00	6.00E-06	0
Conn. Leak		hydraulic	20	3.00E-06	6.00E-05	0.2	1.00	0.02%	0.00	0.00E+00	0
Hoses Rupture		hydraulic	4	3.00E-07	1.20E-06	10	1.00	1.21%	1.00	1.20E-06	0
Hoses Leak		hydraulic	4	3.00E-06	1.20E-05	0.2	1.00	0.02%	0.00	0.00E+00	0
Instruments		hydraulic	0	1.00E-08	0.00E+00	0	1.00	0.00%	0.00	0.00E+00	0
		TOTAL								1.61E-05	1

# CF3I analysis in D-Zero Pit

Air Exhaust 5,000	<b>Q</b> cfm	<b>TC, mi</b>	n.	V/Q			Norma	al operation	ons, bubbl	le chamber iso	lated		
Volume	V	Elevat	ion		Pressi	Pressure							
26,250	ft^3				742 mm								
			N		Р		OUP	R	Time	fCF3I{t2}	D(t2)	Х	CF3I
						F/	AIL	leak	(t2)	FRACT	Exposure	Exp.	
ITEM		TYPE		FAI	L RATE	RA	TE	rate	min.	CF3I	Factor	Rate	Class
BC 1" tube		Bubble Ch.	1	1.0	00E-09	1.00	E-09	684	10.00	11.64%	1.00	1.00E-09	0
BC 1" Valve		Bubble Ch.	1	1.0	00E-08	1.00	E-08	684	10.00	11.64%	1.00	1.00E-08	0
BC Valves		Bubble Ch.	2	1.0	00E-08	2.00	E-08	29	10.00	0.49%	1.00	2.00E-08	0
BC Bellows		Bubble Ch.	1	3.0	00E-06	3.00	E-06	29	10.00	0.49%	1.00	3.00E-06	0
conn.													
rupture		Bubble Ch.	5	3.0	00E-07	1.50	E-06	29	10.00	0.49%	1.00	1.50E-06	0
conn. leak		Bubble Ch.	5	3.0	00E-06	1.50	E-05	0.2	10.00	0.00%	0.00	0.00E+00	0
instruments		Bubble Ch.	1	1.0	30E-08	1.00	E-08	29	10.00	0.49%	1.00	1.00E-08	0
welds		Bubble Ch.	6	3.0	00E-09	1.80	E-08	29	10.00	0.49%	1.00	1.80E-08	0
Pipes		hydraulic	10	1.0	00E-09	1.00	E-08	10	10.00	0.17%	0.00	0.00E+00	0
Elbows		hydraulic	30	3.0	00E-07	9.00	E-06	10	10.00	0.17%	0.00	0.00E+00	0
Tees		hydraulic	25	3.0	00E-07	7.50	E-06	10	10.00	0.17%	0.00	0.00E+00	0
Valves		hydraulic	50	1.0	00E-08	5.00	E-07	10	10.00	0.17%	0.00	0.00E+00	0
connections		hydraulic	200	3.0	00E-06	6.00	E-04	10	10.00	0.17%	0.00	0.00E+00	0
hoses		hydraulic	7	3.0	00E-06	2.10	E-05	10	10.00	0.17%	0.00	0.00E+00	0
instruments		hydraulic	11	1.0	00E-08	1.10	E-07	10	10.00	0.17%	0.00	0.00E+00	0
		TOTAL										4.56E-06	0

# CF3I analysis in D-Zero Pit

### Batch fill or Batch empty operation

Air Input	Q	TC, min.	V/Q								
5,000	cfm	5.25			_						
Volume	V	Elevation		Pressure 742							
26,250	ft^3	700 ft	1	mmHG			1	т	T	r	
			N	Р	GROUP	R	Time	fCF3I{t2}	D(t2)	X	CF3I
ITENA		TVDE		FAIL	FAIL	leak	(t2)	FRACT	Exposure	Even Data	Class
ITEM		TYPE		RATE	RATE	rate	min.	CF3I	Factor	Exp. Rate	Class
BC 1" tube		Bubble Ch.	1	1.00E-09	1.00E-09	684	10.00	11.64%	1.00	1.00E-09	0
BC 1" Valv	_	Bubble Ch.	1	1.00E-08	1.00E-08	684	10.00	11.64%	1.00	1.00E-08	0
BC Valves		Bubble Ch.	2	1.00E-08	2.00E-08	29	10.00	0.49%	1.00	2.00E-08	0
BC Bellows	S	Bubble Ch.	1	3.00E-06	3.00E-06	29	10.00	0.49%	1.00	3.00E-06	0
Conn. Rup	ture	Bubble Ch.	5	3.00E-07	1.50E-06	29	10.00	0.49%	1.00	1.50E-06	0
Conn. Leal	k	Bubble Ch.	5	3.00E-06	1.50E-05	0.2	10.00	0.00%	0.00	0.00E+00	0
Instrument	S	Bubble Ch.	1	1.00E-08	1.00E-08	29	10.00	0.49%	1.00	1.00E-08	0
Welds		Bubble Ch.	6	3.00E-09	1.80E-08	29	10.00	0.49%	1.00	1.80E-08	0
transfer lii	ne	CF <sub>3</sub> I	1	3.00E-06	3.00E-06	29	10.00	0.49%	1.00	3.00E-06	0
operator e	error	open valve	3	3.00E-03	9.00E-03	17	10.00	0.29%	0.45	4.02E-03	3
Pipes		hydraulic	10	1.00E-09	1.00E-08	10	10.00	0.17%	0.00	0.00E+00	0
Elbows		hydraulic	30	3.00E-07	9.00E-06	10	10.00	0.17%	0.00	0.00E+00	0
Tees		hydraulic	25	3.00E-07	7.50E-06	10	10.00	0.17%	0.00	0.00E+00	0
Valves		hydraulic	50	1.00E-08	5.00E-07	10	10.00	0.17%	0.00	0.00E+00	0
Conn. Rup	ture	hydraulic	200	3.00E-07	6.00E-05	10	10.00	0.17%	0.00	0.00E+00	0
Conn. Leal	k	hydraulic	200	3.00E-06	6.00E-04	0.2	10.00	0.00%	0.00	0.00E+00	0
Hoses Rup	oture	hydraulic	7	3.00E-07	2.10E-06	10	10.00	0.17%	0.00	0.00E+00	0
Hoses Lea	k	hydraulic	7	3.00E-06	2.10E-05	0.2	10.00	0.00%	0.00	0.00E+00	0
Instrument	s	hydraulic	11	1.00E-08	1.10E-07	0	10.00	0.00%	0.00	0.00E+00	0
		TOTAL								4.03E-03	3

# ODH analysis Inside Empty Water Tank

Air Input	Q	TC, min.		V/Q	Batch fi	ll or Ba	tch em	oty operatio	n		
500	cfm	1.06									
Volume	٧	Eleva	tion	Pressure	Э						
530	ft^3	700 ft		742 mmH	G						
			N	Р	GROUP	R	Time	fO2{t2}	F (t2)	Ø	ODH
ITEM		TYPE		FAIL RATE	FAIL RATE	leak	(t2) min.	FRACT	Fatal. Factor	Fatal. Rate	Class
						rate	1	02			
BC 1" tube		Bubble Ch.	1	1.00E-09	1.00E-09	684	1.00	10.17%	9.47E-04	9.47E-13	0
BC 1" Valve		Bubble Ch.	1	1.00E-08	1.00E-08	684	1.00	10.17%	9.47E-04	9.47E-12	0
BC Valves		Bubble Ch.	4	1.00E-08	4.00E-08	29	1.00	20.27%	1.81E-09	7.24E-17	0
BC Bellows		Bubble Ch.	1	3.00E-06	3.00E-06	29	1.00	20.27%	1.81E-09	5.43E-15	0
Conn. rupture		Bubble Ch.	8	3.00E-07	2.40E-06	29	1.00	20.27%	1.81E-09	4.34E-15	0
Conn. leak		Bubble Ch.	8	3.00E-06	2.40E-05	0.2	1.00	20.99%	8.41E-10	2.02E-14	0
Instruments		Bubble Ch.	1	1.00E-08	1.00E-08	29	1.00	20.27%	1.81E-09	1.81E-17	0
Welds		Bubble Ch.	10	3.00E-09	3.00E-08	29	1.00	20.27%	1.81E-09	5.43E-17	0
transfer line		CF3I	1	3.00E-06	3.00E-06	29	1.00	20.27%	1.81E-09	5.43E-15	0
operator error		open valve	3	3.00E-03	9.00E-03	17	1.00	20.57%	1.32E-09	1.19E-11	0
Pipes		hydraulic	5	1.00E-09	5.00E-09	10	1.00	20.75%	1.09E-09	5.47E-18	0
Elbows		hydraulic	10	3.00E-07	3.00E-06	10	1.00	20.75%	1.09E-09	3.28E-15	0
Tees		hydraulic	4	3.00E-07	1.20E-06	10	1.00	20.75%	1.09E-09	1.31E-15	0
Valves		hydraulic	10	1.00E-08	1.00E-07	10	1.00	20.75%	1.09E-09	1.09E-16	0
Connections		hydraulic	20	3.00E-06	6.00E-05	10	1.00	20.75%	1.09E-09	6.56E-14	0
Hoses		hydraulic	4	3.00E-06	1.20E-05	10	1.00	20.75%	1.09E-09	1.31E-14	0
Instruments		hydraulic	0	1.00E-08	0.00E+00	10	1.00	20.75%	1.09E-09	0.00E+00	0
		TOTAL								2.24E-11	0

# CF3I analysis Inside Empty Water Tank

### Batch fill or Batch empty operation

Air Input	Q	TC, min.	V/Q				. ,	•			
500	cfm	1.06			_						
Volume	V 442	Elevation		Pressure 742							
530	ft^3	700 ft		mmHG	000110		I <b>-</b> .	(0501(10)	D((0)	1 ,	0=01
			N	<b>P</b> FAIL	GROUP FAIL	R leak	Time	fCF3I{t2} FRACT	D(t2)	X	CF3I
ITEM		TYPE		RATE	RATE	rate	(t2) min.	CF3I	Exposure Factor	Exp. Rate	Class
BC 1" tube		Bubble Ch.	1	1.00E-09	1.00E-09	684	1.00	51.58%	1.00	1.00E-09	0
BC 1" Valve	:	Bubble Ch.	1	1.00E-08	1.00E-08	684	1.00	51.58%	1.00	1.00E-08	0
BC Valves		Bubble Ch.	2	1.00E-08	2.00E-08	29	1.00	3.46%	1.00	2.00E-08	0
BC Bellows		Bubble Ch.	1	3.00E-06	3.00E-06	29	1.00	3.46%	1.00	3.00E-06	0
Conn. Ruptu	ure	Bubble Ch.	5	3.00E-07	1.50E-06	29	1.00	3.46%	1.00	1.50E-06	0
Conn. Leak		Bubble Ch.	5	3.00E-06	1.50E-05	0.2	1.00	0.02%	0.00	0.00E+00	0
instruments		Bubble Ch.	1	1.00E-08	1.00E-08	29	1.00	3.46%	1.00	1.00E-08	0
welds		Bubble Ch.	6	3.00E-09	1.80E-08	29	1.00	3.46%	1.00	1.80E-08	0
transfer line	е	CF3I	1	3.00E-06	3.00E-06	29	1.00	3.46%	1.00	3.00E-06	0
operator er	ror	open valve	3	3.00E-03	9.00E-03	17	1.00	2.05%	1.00	9.00E-03	3
Pipes		hydraulic	5	1.00E-09	5.00E-09	10	1.00	1.21%	1.00	5.00E-09	0
Elbows		hydraulic	10	3.00E-07	3.00E-06	10	1.00	1.21%	1.00	3.00E-06	0
Tees		hydraulic	4	3.00E-07	1.20E-06	10	1.00	1.21%	1.00	1.20E-06	0
Valves		hydraulic	10	1.00E-08	1.00E-07	10	1.00	1.21%	1.00	1.00E-07	0
Conn. Ruptu	ure	hydraulic	20	3.00E-07	6.00E-06	10	1.00	1.21%	1.00	6.00E-06	0
Conn. Leak		hydraulic	20	3.00E-06	6.00E-05	0.2	1.00	0.02%	0.00	0.00E+00	0
Hoses Rupt	ure	hydraulic	4	3.00E-07	1.20E-06	10	1.00	1.21%	1.00	1.20E-06	0
Hoses Leak		hydraulic	4	3.00E-06	1.20E-05	0.2	1.00	0.02%	0.00	0.00E+00	0
instruments		hydraulic	0	1.00E-08	0.00E+00	0	1.00	0.00%	0.00	0.00E+00	0
		TOTAL								9.02E-03	3

# Raw Formulas for the Excel Spreadsheets shown below

# **ODH analysis Inside Empty Water Tank**

Air Input 500	<b>Q</b> cfm	TC, min. =A7/A5	٧	/Q		ch fill o ty ope	r Batch ration	1
Volume	V	Elevatio	'n	Press	uro			
530	t/3	700	'''		0262*C7+0.0	000000	285*(	7/2)
330	11 5	700	N	P	GROUP	R	Time	fO2{t2}
			13	F	FAIL	leak	(t2)	102{12}
ITEM		TYPE		FAIL RATE	RATE	rate	min.	FRACT O2
BC 1" tube		Bubble Ch.	1	0.00000001	=D10*E10	684	1	=(0.21/(\$A\$5+G10)*(\$A\$5+G10*EXP(-(\$A\$5+G10)*K10/\$A\$7)))
BC 1" Valve		Bubble Ch.	1	0.0000001	=D11*E11	684	1	=(0.21/(\$A\$5+G11)*(\$A\$5+G11*EXP(-(\$A\$5+G11)*K11/\$A\$7)))
BC Valves		Bubble Ch.	4	0.0000001	=D12*E12	29	1	=(0.21/(\$A\$5+G12)*(\$A\$5+G12*EXP(-(\$A\$5+G12)*K12/\$A\$7)))
BC Bellows		Bubble Ch.	1	0.000003	=D13*E13	29	1	=(0.21/(\$A\$5+G13)*(\$A\$5+G13*EXP(-(\$A\$5+G13)*K13/\$A\$7)))
Conn. rupture		Bubble Ch.	8	0.0000003	=D14*E14	29	1	=(0.21/(\$A\$5+G14)*(\$A\$5+G14*EXP(-(\$A\$5+G14)*K14/\$A\$7)))
Conn. leak		Bubble Ch.	8	0.000003	=D15*E15	0.2	1	=(0.21/(\$A\$5+G15)*(\$A\$5+G15*EXP(-(\$A\$5+G15)*K15/\$A\$7)))
Instruments		Bubble Ch.	1	0.0000001	=D16*E16	29	1	=(0.21/(\$A\$5+G16)*(\$A\$5+G16*EXP(-(\$A\$5+G16)*K16/\$A\$7)))
Welds		Bubble Ch.	10	0.00000003	=D17*E17	29	1	=(0.21/(\$A\$5+G17)*(\$A\$5+G17*EXP(-(\$A\$5+G17)*K17/\$A\$7)))
transfer line		CF3I	1	0.000003	=D18*E18	29	1	=(0.21/(\$A\$5+G18)*(\$A\$5+G18*EXP(-(\$A\$5+G18)*K18/\$A\$7)))
operator		_						
error		open valve	3	0.003	=D19*E19	17	1	=(0.21/(\$A\$5+G19)*(\$A\$5+G19*EXP(-(\$A\$5+G19)*K19/\$A\$7)))
Pipes		hydraulic	5	0.000000001	=D20*E20	10	1	=(0.21/(\$A\$5+G20)*(\$A\$5+G20*EXP(-(\$A\$5+G20)*K20/\$A\$7)))
Elbows		hydraulic	10	0.0000003	=D21*E21	10	1	=(0.21/(\$A\$5+G21)*(\$A\$5+G21*EXP(-(\$A\$5+G21)*K21/\$A\$7)))
Tees		hydraulic	4	0.0000003	=D22*E22	10	1	=(0.21/(\$A\$5+G22)*(\$A\$5+G22*EXP(-(\$A\$5+G22)*K22/\$A\$7)))
Valves		hydraulic	10	0.0000001	=D23*E23	10	1	=(0.21/(\$A\$5+G23)*(\$A\$5+G23*EXP(-(\$A\$5+G23)*K23/\$A\$7)))
Connections		hydraulic	20	0.000003	=D24*E24	10	1	=(0.21/(\$A\$5+G24)*(\$A\$5+G24*EXP(-(\$A\$5+G24)*K24/\$A\$7)))
Hoses		hydraulic	4	0.000003	=D25*E25	10	1	=(0.21/(\$A\$5+G25)*(\$A\$5+G25*EXP(-(\$A\$5+G25)*K25/\$A\$7)))
Instruments		hydraulic	0	0.0000001	=D26*E26	10	1	=(0.21/(\$A\$5+G26)*(\$A\$5+G26*EXP(-(\$A\$5+G26)*K26/\$A\$7)))
		TOTAL						

F (t2)	Ø	ODH
Fatal. Factor	Fatal. Rate	Class
=IF(J10>0.08553,10^(6.5-(\$E\$7/10)*J10),1)	=F10*(M10)	=IF(N10<=0.0000001,0,IF(N10<=0.00001,1,IF(N10<=0.001,2,IF(N10<=0.1,3,4))))
=IF(J11>0.08553,10^(6.5-(\$E\$7/10)*J11),1)	=F11*(M11)	=IF(N11<=0.0000001,0,IF(N11<=0.00001,1,IF(N11<=0.001,2,IF(N11<=0.1,3,4))))
=IF(J12>0.08553,10^(6.5-(\$E\$7/10)*J12),1)	=F12*(M12)	=IF(N12<=0.0000001,0,IF(N12<=0.00001,1,IF(N12<=0.001,2,IF(N12<=0.1,3,4))))
=IF(J13>0.08553,10^(6.5-(\$E\$7/10)*J13),1)	=F13*(M13)	=IF(N13<=0.0000001,0,IF(N13<=0.00001,1,IF(N13<=0.001,2,IF(N13<=0.1,3,4))))
=IF(J14>0.08553,10^(6.5-(\$E\$7/10)*J14),1)	=F14*(M14)	=IF(N14<=0.0000001,0,IF(N14<=0.00001,1,IF(N14<=0.001,2,IF(N14<=0.1,3,4))))
=IF(J15>0.08553,10^(6.5-(\$E\$7/10)*J15),1)	=F15*(M15)	=IF(N15<=0.0000001,0,IF(N15<=0.00001,1,IF(N15<=0.001,2,IF(N15<=0.1,3,4))))
=IF(J16>0.08553,10^(6.5-(\$E\$7/10)*J16),1)	=F16*(M16)	=IF(N16<=0.0000001,0,IF(N16<=0.00001,1,IF(N16<=0.001,2,IF(N16<=0.1,3,4))))
=IF(J17>0.08553,10^(6.5-(\$E\$7/10)*J17),1)	=F17*(M17)	=IF(N17<=0.0000001,0,IF(N17<=0.00001,1,IF(N17<=0.001,2,IF(N17<=0.1,3,4))))
=IF(J18>0.08553,10^(6.5-(\$E\$7/10)*J18),1)	=F18*(M18)	=IF(N18<=0.0000001,0,IF(N18<=0.00001,1,IF(N18<=0.001,2,IF(N18<=0.1,3,4))))
=IF(J19>0.08553,10^(6.5-(\$E\$7/10)*J19),1)	=F19*(M19)	=IF(N19<=0.0000001,0,IF(N19<=0.00001,1,IF(N19<=0.001,2,IF(N19<=0.1,3,4))))
=IF(J20>0.08553,10^(6.5-(\$E\$7/10)*J20),1)	=F20*(M20)	=IF(N20<=0.0000001,0,IF(N20<=0.00001,1,IF(N20<=0.001,2,IF(N20<=0.1,3,4))))
=IF(J21>0.08553,10^(6.5-(\$E\$7/10)*J21),1)	=F21*(M21)	=IF(N21<=0.0000001,0,IF(N21<=0.00001,1,IF(N21<=0.001,2,IF(N21<=0.1,3,4))))
=IF(J22>0.08553,10^(6.5-(\$E\$7/10)*J22),1)	=F22*(M22)	= IF(N22 <= 0.0000001, 0, IF(N22 <= 0.00001, 1, IF(N22 <= 0.001, 2, IF(N22 <= 0.1, 3, 4))))
=IF(J23>0.08553,10^(6.5-(\$E\$7/10)*J23),1)	=F23*(M23)	= IF(N23 <= 0.0000001, 0, IF(N23 <= 0.00001, 1, IF(N23 <= 0.001, 2, IF(N23 <= 0.1, 3, 4))))
=IF(J24>0.08553,10^(6.5-(\$E\$7/10)*J24),1)	=F24*(M24)	=IF(N24<=0.0000001,0,IF(N24<=0.00001,1,IF(N24<=0.001,2,IF(N24<=0.1,3,4))))

=IF(J25>0.08553,10^(6.5-(\$E\$7/10)*J25),1)	=F25*(M25)	=IF(N25<=0.0000001,0,IF(N25<=0.00001,1,IF(N25<=0.001,2,IF(N25<=0.1,3,4))))
=IF(J26>0.08553,10^(6.5-(\$E\$7/10)*J26),1)	=F26*(M26)	=IF(N26<=0.0000001,0,IF(N26<=0.00001,1,IF(N26<=0.001,2,IF(N26<=0.1,3,4))))
	JM(N10:N26)	=IF(N27<=0.0000001,0,IF(N27<=0.00001,1,IF(N27<=0.001,2,IF(N27<=0.1,3,4))))

# Raw Formulas for CF3I analysis

# CF3I analysis Inside Empty Water Tank

Batch fill or Batch empty operation

Air Input	Q	Т	C, min	. V/Q				
500	cfm	=	A7/A5					
Volume	V		Ele	vation	Pressure			
530	ft^3		700		=	760-0.02	62*C7+0	.000000285*(C7^2)
			N	Р	GROUP	R leak	Time (t2)	fCF3I{t2}
ITEM	1	TYPE		FAIL RATE	FAIL RATE	rate	min.	FRACT CF3I
BC 1" tube	Bub	ble Ch.	1	0.000000001	=D10*E10	684	1	=1-(1/(\$A\$5+G10)*(\$A\$5+G10*EXP(-(\$A\$5+G10)*K10/\$A\$7)))
BC 1" Valve	Bub	Bubble Ch.		0.00000001	=D11*E11	684	1	=1-(1/(\$A\$5+G11)*(\$A\$5+G11*EXP(-(\$A\$5+G11)*K11/\$A\$7)))
BC Valves	alves Bubble Ch		2	0.00000001	=D12*E12	29	1	=1-(1/(\$A\$5+G12)*(\$A\$5+G12*EXP(-(\$A\$5+G12)*K12/\$A\$7)))
BC Bellows	ellows Bubble Ch.		1	0.000003	=D13*E13	29	1	=1-(1/(\$A\$5+G13)*(\$A\$5+G13*EXP(-(\$A\$5+G13)*K13/\$A\$7)))
Conn. Rupture	Rupture Bubble Ch.		5	0.0000003	=D14*E14	29	1	=1-(1/(\$A\$5+G14)*(\$A\$5+G14*EXP(-(\$A\$5+G14)*K14/\$A\$7)))
Conn. Leak	Bub	ble Ch. 5		0.000003	=D15*E15	0.2	1	=1-(1/(\$A\$5+G15)*(\$A\$5+G15*EXP(-(\$A\$5+G15)*K15/\$A\$7)))
instruments	ıments Bubble Ch.		1	0.00000001	=D16*E16	29	1	=1-(1/(\$A\$5+G16)*(\$A\$5+G16*EXP(-(\$A\$5+G16)*K16/\$A\$7)))
welds	Bub	ble Ch.	6	0.000000003	=D17*E17	29	1	=1-(1/(\$A\$5+G17)*(\$A\$5+G17*EXP(-(\$A\$5+G17)*K17/\$A\$7)))
transfer line	CF3	31	1	0.000003	=D18*E18	29	1	=1-(1/(\$A\$5+G18)*(\$A\$5+G18*EXP(-(\$A\$5+G18)*K18/\$A\$7)))
operator error	ope	n valve	3	0.003	=D19*E19	17	1	=1-(1/(\$A\$5+G19)*(\$A\$5+G19*EXP(-(\$A\$5+G19)*K19/\$A\$7)))
Pipes	hyd	raulic	5	0.000000001	=D20*E20	10	1	=1-(1/(\$A\$5+G20)*(\$A\$5+G20*EXP(-(\$A\$5+G20)*K20/\$A\$7)))
Elbows	hyd	raulic	10	0.0000003	=D21*E21	10	1	=1-(1/(\$A\$5+G21)*(\$A\$5+G21*EXP(-(\$A\$5+G21)*K21/\$A\$7)))
Tees	hyd	raulic	4	0.0000003	=D22*E22	10	1	=1-(1/(\$A\$5+G22)*(\$A\$5+G22*EXP(-(\$A\$5+G22)*K22/\$A\$7)))
Valves	hyd	raulic	10	0.00000001	=D23*E23	10	1	=1-(1/(\$A\$5+G23)*(\$A\$5+G23*EXP(-(\$A\$5+G23)*K23/\$A\$7)))
Conn. Rupture	hyd	raulic	20	0.0000003	=D24*E24	10	1	=1-(1/(\$A\$5+G24)*(\$A\$5+G24*EXP(-(\$A\$5+G24)*K24/\$A\$7)))
Conn. Leak	hyd	raulic	20	0.000003	=D25*E25	0.2	1	=1-(1/(\$A\$5+G25)*(\$A\$5+G25*EXP(-(\$A\$5+G25)*K25/\$A\$7)))
Hoses Rupture	hyd	raulic	4	0.0000003	=D26*E26	10	1	=1-(1/(\$A\$5+G26)*(\$A\$5+G26*EXP(-(\$A\$5+G26)*K26/\$A\$7)))
Hoses Leak	hyd	raulic	4	0.000003	=D27*E27	0.2	1	=1-(1/(\$A\$5+G27)*(\$A\$5+G27*EXP(-(\$A\$5+G27)*K27/\$A\$7)))
instruments	hyd	raulic	0	0.00000001	=D28*E28	0	1	=1-(1/(\$A\$5+G28)*(\$A\$5+G28*EXP(-(\$A\$5+G28)*K28/\$A\$7)))
		TOTAL						

D(t2)	x	CF3I
Exposure Factor	Exp. Rate	Class
=IF(L10>0.004,1,IF(L10<0.002,0,L10/0.002-1))	=F10*(M10)	=IF(N10<=0.00001,0,IF(N10<=0.0001,1,IF(N10<=0.001,2,IF(N10<=0.01,3,4))))
=IF(L11>0.004,1,IF(L11<0.002,0,L11/0.002-1))	=F11*(M11)	=IF(N11<=0.00001,0,IF(N11<=0.0001,1,IF(N11<=0.001,2,IF(N11<=0.01,3,4))))
=IF(L12>0.004,1,IF(L12<0.002,0,L12/0.002-1))	=F12*(M12)	=IF(N12<=0.00001,0,IF(N12<=0.0001,1,IF(N12<=0.001,2,IF(N12<=0.01,3,4))))
=IF(L13>0.004,1,IF(L13<0.002,0,L13/0.002-1))	=F13*(M13)	=IF(N13<=0.00001,0,IF(N13<=0.0001,1,IF(N13<=0.001,2,IF(N13<=0.01,3,4))))
=IF(L14>0.004,1,IF(L14<0.002,0,L14/0.002-1))	=F14*(M14)	=IF(N14<=0.00001,0,IF(N14<=0.0001,1,IF(N14<=0.001,2,IF(N14<=0.01,3,4))))
=IF(L15>0.004,1,IF(L15<0.002,0,L15/0.002-1))	=F15*(M15)	=IF(N15<=0.00001,0,IF(N15<=0.0001,1,IF(N15<=0.001,2,IF(N15<=0.01,3,4))))
=IF(L16>0.004,1,IF(L16<0.002,0,L16/0.002-1))	=F16*(M16)	=IF(N16<=0.00001,0,IF(N16<=0.0001,1,IF(N16<=0.001,2,IF(N16<=0.01,3,4))))
=IF(L17>0.004,1,IF(L17<0.002,0,L17/0.002-1))	=F17*(M17)	=IF(N17<=0.00001,0,IF(N17<=0.0001,1,IF(N17<=0.001,2,IF(N17<=0.01,3,4))))

	=SUM(N10:N28)	=IF(N29<=0.00001,0,IF(N29<=0.0001,1,IF(N29<=0.001,2,IF(N29<=0.01,3,4))))
=IF(L28>0.004,1,IF(L28<0.002,0,L28/0.002-1))	=F28*(M28)	=IF(N28<=0.00001,0,IF(N28<=0.0001,1,IF(N28<=0.001,2,IF(N28<=0.01,3,4))))
=IF(L27>0.004,1,IF(L27<0.002,0,L27/0.002-1))	=F27*(M27)	=IF(N27<=0.00001,0,IF(N27<=0.0001,1,IF(N27<=0.001,2,IF(N27<=0.01,3,4))))
=IF(L26>0.004,1,IF(L26<0.002,0,L26/0.002-1))	=F26*(M26)	=IF(N26<=0.00001,0,IF(N26<=0.0001,1,IF(N26<=0.001,2,IF(N26<=0.01,3,4))))
=IF(L25>0.004,1,IF(L25<0.002,0,L25/0.002-1))	=F25*(M25)	=IF(N25<=0.00001,0,IF(N25<=0.0001,1,IF(N25<=0.001,2,IF(N25<=0.01,3,4))))
=IF(L24>0.004,1,IF(L24<0.002,0,L24/0.002-1))	=F24*(M24)	=IF(N24<=0.00001,0,IF(N24<=0.0001,1,IF(N24<=0.001,2,IF(N24<=0.01,3,4))))
=IF(L23>0.004,1,IF(L23<0.002,0,L23/0.002-1))	=F23*(M23)	=IF(N23<=0.00001,0,IF(N23<=0.0001,1,IF(N23<=0.001,2,IF(N23<=0.01,3,4))))
=IF(L22>0.004,1,IF(L22<0.002,0,L22/0.002-1))	=F22*(M22)	=IF(N22<=0.00001,0,IF(N22<=0.0001,1,IF(N22<=0.001,2,IF(N22<=0.01,3,4))))
=IF(L21>0.004,1,IF(L21<0.002,0,L21/0.002-1))	=F21*(M21)	=IF(N21<=0.00001,0,IF(N21<=0.0001,1,IF(N21<=0.001,2,IF(N21<=0.01,3,4))))
=IF(L20>0.004,1,IF(L20<0.002,0,L20/0.002-1))	=F20*(M20)	=IF(N20<=0.00001,0,IF(N20<=0.0001,1,IF(N20<=0.001,2,IF(N20<=0.01,3,4))))
=IF(L19>0.004,1,IF(L19<0.002,0,L19/0.002-1))	=F19*(M19)	=IF(N19<=0.00001,0,IF(N19<=0.0001,1,IF(N19<=0.001,2,IF(N19<=0.01,3,4))))
=IF(L18>0.004,1,IF(L18<0.002,0,L18/0.002-1))	=F18*(M18)	=IF(N18<=0.00001,0,IF(N18<=0.0001,1,IF(N18<=0.001,2,IF(N18<=0.01,3,4))))
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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>i</sup> Skaggs, S. R., and Rubenstein, R., "Setting the Occupational Exposure Limits for CF3I," Proceedings, Halon Options Technical Working Conference, Albuquerque, NM, pp. 254-261, 1991.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>ii</sup> Fermi National Accelerator Lab ES&H Manual chapter 5064, May 2009 revision, http://www-esh.fnal.gov/FESHM/5000/5064.htm.

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<sup>&</sup>quot;Iodotrifluoromethane: Toxicity Review". (National Academies Press, 2004), p. 3.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>iv</sup> National Research Council, Committee on Toxicology, Subcommittee on Iodotrifluoromethane,

<sup>&</sup>quot;Iodotrifluoromethane: Toxicity Review". (National Academies Press, 2004), p. 8.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>v</sup> R. Rucinski, D-Zero Assembly Hall ODH Analysis, DZero Engineering note 3823.115-EN-463, March 1997, revised May 1997.